- A “legal person” - company, charity, foundation etc - is a construct where a group of people choose to create an entity for a specified purpose and then ask a State to regard it as having been created.
Not sure about personhood. I think the extent to which states grant personal rights to organizational constructs differs around the world. Philosophically, I would some aspects of organizational personhood are at the the very least problematic.
Friendship is not the best metaphor for trusteeship. The basis for trusteeship is commitment to a cause - worthiness of trust.
agree between themselves which of them will take the day-to-day supervisory responsibility on behalf of all the friends. Those people are called “directors” and the set of them collectively is called “the board”. They assume all the responsibility for the entity and have authority delegated to them by the friends, who step back and then simply observe.
Observing is not simple, nor is it stepping back - it is an active duty. Many formal bodies even have observer-status members, who can’t vote, but definitely participate. Trustees need to both expend effort observing, and whenever necessary - intervene, at least through speech if not otherwise.
In practice, many/most trustees do not; but that’s the undesirable state, not the expected one.
- One might say the staff work for the entity, but the selection, direction, evaluation and compensation of the staff is the sole responsibility of the board
Evaluation is not the sole responsibility of the board. And as for compensation - monetary compensation is up to the board, but not social and emotional compensation.
on behalf of the friends in order to achieve the purpose of the entity. Therefore many people prefer to say the staff work for the board - it’s the same meaning either way as the board is the empowered tip of the entity.
- “Therefore” in that sentence is logically invalid. The sentence does not follow from the previous one.
- The meanings of “working for the foundation” and “working for the board” are quite different
- All of the resources of the entity - whether donations, income, physical goods or contractual creations - are ultimately managed at the direction of the Board - only a vote of the directors allows any resources to be dispensed or used. Obviously it is impractical for the board to make a decision about every tiny thing, so they will typically delegate their authority to others. This applies to /everything/ - spending, investments, salaries and any other transfer of assets.
Not sure if that’s what you meant to imply, but board don’t typically delegate a lot of authority, but not all of it.
- Generally volunteer positions should have fixed terms (renewable or not), so that volunteers have a natural break point at which they can stand down without feeling they are deserting.
Elected positions are not exactly volunteer positions. But I agree that limiting terms of office is an important thing. I would say the criterion should be the amount of decision-making power you have, i.e. the more of it - the more important it is for your term to be limited.
And - yes, there’s a contradiction between the interest of having experienced people at key positions, and employing people stably - and the desire to prevent ossification of power relations in the organization.
- Larger organisations - with a membership too big for everyone to know each other - instead opt for fixed-terms and regular elections. This leads to a less optimal board - an election cannot guarantee diversity on any axis, and often elects people who are popular rather than suitable. It can lead to boards that find consensus harder to reach, and sometimes leads to gridlock when an unsuitable director fails to accept the majority decisions.
Or an unsuitable majority fails to accept there are other considerations which they have ignored or people whose interests are offended by their approach, which a minority director is upholding or reflecting.
Addressing this with bylaws is hard, as there are so many ways dysfunction can manifest and solving one mode can easily lead to triggering another.
Indeed. In fact, I’d say that almost any set of bylaws/statutes has several built-in, almost to-be-expected, dysfunctionality traps; and the best you can do is shift them around, not avoid them completely.
- Since staff are employed at the board’s pleasure
Staff are definitely not employed at the board’s pleasure. And that’s partly, though not entirely, because the staff don’t work for the board.
, term limits (apart from initial appointment) are less applicable. I only know of one entity that applies a term limit, to their executive director, and that’s because the appointment is also confirmed by popular vote.
This is indeed a tricky subject, at least in principle. An ED of a foundation is quite a powerful position - sometimes enough to have effect on the election results of the BoD that supervises them. At the same time - it is a salaried position for an employee; and it is problematic for such an employee to be terminated despite having quite possibly fulfilled their obligations adequately, or even wonderfully.
I don’t have a strong position on this matter in general. It is easier to accept in an organization where the employees can have a longer-term role, assume ED’ship for several years, and return to their role after that term. But we are not that large. That way they don’t get fired, but have a reassignment of duties. This is similar to appointment of, say, tenured university faculty members to managerial or other high-official positions: They serve for a while, then go back to their “regular” research and teaching.
(@floeff : no shade on your work, I was just having the abstract discussion.)
Eyal